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be interpreted solely with reference to the standard of excessive punish-
ment. This interpretation has been made in the well-considered New York
decisions.14
Besides the above statute in the Education Code, California needs a
specific statute in the Penal Code for schoolteachers which states that,
subject to the limitation of excessiveness, the use of force by a schoolteacher
upon a pupil is not unlawful. This proper legal conception of corporal
punishment, in the light of the exigencies of mass education, has been set
forth in the Pennsylvania decisions.25
Charles H. Carpenter*
24People v. Baldini, 4 Misc. 2d 913, 159 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Mt. Vernon City Ct.
1957); People v. Newton, 185 Misc. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d 779 (White Plains City Ct. 1945);
People v. Petrie, 120 Misc. 221, 198 N.Y. Supp. 81 (Herkimer County Ct. 1923).25 Chodkowski v. Beck, 106 Pittsb. Leg. J. 115 (C.P. Allegheny County Pa. 1957);
Appeal of Old Forge, 43 Pa. D. & C. 167, 43 Lack. 187 (C.P. Lackawanna County
1941); Rupp v. Zinter, 29 Pa. D. & C. 625 (C.P. Montgomery County 1937).
* Member, Second Year Class.
DUTIES OF A GENERAL CONTRACTOR UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
The general contractor on a large construction site performs little, if
any, of the actual work. His efforts are confined to organization and super-
vision of the work of the many subcontractors employed on the project, so
that completion will be achieved on schedule and according to the specifica-
tions of the owner. The presence of many laborers working in close prox-
imity to each other, under the direction of different subcontractors, leads
inevitably to accidents on the site. The purpose of this note is to examine
the duties of the general contractor to the employees of subcontractors.
Non-statutory duties will be discussed as well as certain provisions of the
California Labor Code which seem to affect these duties.
Master and Servant and the Independent Contractor
The existence of a master and servant relation imposes upon the master
the common law duty to provide his servant with a reasonably safe place
to work and reasonably safe appliances." The subcontractor is subject to
these duties,2 but this is of little importance because of the immunity from
common law liability afforded him by the Workmen's Compensation Act.3
IPossa, TORTs § 67 (2d ed. 1955).
21bid.
3 The Workmen's Compensation Act is set out in Divisions 4 and 4.5 of CAL. LABoR
CODE; 55 CAL. JtR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 10 (1960), discusses the exclusive
character of the remedy where it is applicable.
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The subcontractor may be liable, however, for injuries to employees of other
subcontractors, but only when his own affirmative negligence can be shown.4
Under common law principles the general contractor is not subject to
these duties to provide a safe place and safe appliances, as he is not the
master of his subcontractor's employees. 5 Nor is he subject to liability for
the negligence of the independent subcontractor under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, because he maintains no control over the operative
details of the work.6 This ability of the general contractor to insulate him-
self from respondeat superior liability is subject to the rule that, in certain
instances, his duty to exercise reasonable care in the protection of the sub-
contractor's employees is considered non-delegable. 7 Furthermore, if the
general contractor assumes responsibility for the direction of the work, he
then becomes liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in the exercise
of his responsibility.8
Invitor Duties
As possessor of the premises, the general contractor is subject to the
duties of an invitor to all workmen on the construction site.9 By virtue of
this relationship, the general contractor is under a duty to exercise ordinary
care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of dan-
gers.' 0 The duty is not limited to dangers created by him or of which he
has knowledge but includes those which by the use of reasonable care he
should have acquired knowledge." Hence, the general contractor may be-
come liable to an employee of an independent contractor for injuries occa-
sioned by a dangerous condition negligently created by another independent
4A subcontractor's duty to the employees of other subcontractors is merely to act
as a reasonable man under the circumstances. See Johnson v. Nicholson, 159 Cal. App.
2d 395, 324 P.2d 307 (1958); Hayden v. Paramount Prods., 33 Cal. App. 2d 287, 91
P.2d 231 (1939); Bleser v. Thomas Haverty Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 199, 38 P.2d 873 (1934).
5 The master and servant relationship is similar in many ways to the employer-
employee relationship under workmen's compensation. Regarding the importance of con-
trol over the putative servant or employee in determining the relationship see Comment,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 161, 168 (1960), for a discussion of the similarities; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 220 (1958) lists the factors to be considered in determining the
existence of these relationships.
6 Absence of control is the primary basis for determining the existence of an inde-
pendent contractor. See PRossER, TORTS § 64 (2d ed. 1955).7 Thus where an ultrahazardous activity is involved, the general contractor is held
to a duty of care toward the employee of the independent contractor, notwithstanding
the existence of independent control. lhossun, TORTS § 64 (2d ed. 1955). Further in-
stances where the general contractor's duties have been held non-delegable and therefore
to apply to the employee of an independent contractor have arisen when the work was
done under a public license, where the general contractor created or allowed to be cre-
ated a nuisance, and where the general contractor was under a duty to repair as owner
of the premises. 2 WrrJN, SurNnmL OF CA.inoRNrA LAw Torts § 312 (7th ed. 1960).
Even at common law, one could not escape all liability by simply hiring another to do
the work for him.8 PossER, ToRTS § 64 (2d ed. 1955).
9 Florez v. Groom Dev. Co., 53 Cal. 2d 347, 1 Cal. Rptr. 840, 348 P.2d 200 (1960).
10 Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951).
11 Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 282 P.2d 69 (1955).
NOTES
contractor.12 If, however, the danger should be obvious to an employee,
the general rule is that the invitor has no duty to warn.13 The question of
obviousness is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.14
Labor Code Duties
The California Labor Code contains two definitions of employer and
employee. For purposes of determining the existence of the employer-
employee relationship for workmen's compensation coverage, an employer
is defined in part as "Every person including any public service corporation,
which has any natural person in service." 5 An employee eligible for work-
men's compensation benefits is ". . . every person in the service of an em-
ployer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship .... 16
These definitions are expressly confined to Division 4 of the Labor Code,
which provides a system for determination and payment of workmen's com-
pensation awards, but does not prescribe affirmative duties on an employer
to take measures for assuring the safety of employees under his direction.
This latter function is performed by Division 5, entitled "Safety in Em-
ployment." In Part 1 of Division 5, entitled "Workmen's Safety,' both em-
ployer and employee are defined more broadly than in Division 4. Section
6304 provides that employer includes " . . every person having direction,
management, control, or custody of any employment, place of employment,
or any employee." An employee is defined in section 6305 as ".... every
person who is required or directed by any employer, to engage in any em-
ployment, or to go to work or be at any time in any place of employment." 7
It was evidently the intention of the legislature to include within the em-
ployer-employee relationship, for purposes of protecting against employment
injuries, persons who are not, with respect to each other, employer and
employee in the traditional sense of those terms.
A general contractor on a construction project has custody of,'8 and
direction, management and control over, the construction site, which cer-
tainly qualifies as a place of employment. He would therefore seem to be
an employer within section 6304. Since an employee of an independent
subcontractor on a construction project is at least "in any place of employ-
ment" at the direction of "any employer," he would appear to be an employee
within section 6305.
Under this interpretation, the 'Workmen's Safety" provisions of the Labor
Code impose on the general contractor statutory duties to take affirmative
measures for the safety of all workmen on the construction site, in addition
to his common law duties as invitor. Section 6400 requires the employer to
12 See dicta in cases cited in notes 9-11 supra.
"3 Dingman v. A. F. Mattock Co., 15 Cal. 2d 622, 104 P.2d 26 (1940); PRossER,
To Ts § 78 (2d ed. 1955). The logic might as easily be that the employee is contribu-
torily negligent or assumes the risk in such an instance.
14 Dingman v. A. F. Mattock Co., supra note 13.
15 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3300.
16 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351.
"7 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6301 confines these definitions of employer and employee to
Part 1 of Division 5, "Workmen's Safety."
Is This element of custody is the basis of the invitor duties discussed above; see
note 9 supra.
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furnish employees a safe place to work. Section 6401 provides that "Every
employer shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt
and use practices, means, methods, operations, and processes, which are
reasonably adequate to render such employment and place of employment
safe." It further provides that an employer ".... shall do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees." Addi-
tional duties are provided by section 6500 which gives the Division of In-
dustrial Safety the authority to promulgate safety orders regarding safety
devices, safeguards, and methods of work.' 9 The safety orders enacted
under this section of the Labor Code establish minimum standards of care20
but do not abrogate any higher standards which may be fixed by custom
or statute in a particular locality.2
A literal reading of sections 6304 and 6305 seems clearly to justify this
broad interpretation. The California courts, however, have experienced
some difficulty in determining whether and under what conditions a general
contractor is a section 6304 employer subject to the broad duties of sections
6400 and 6401.
Enacted in 1917 and revised in 1937, the provisions seemingly went
unnoticed by injured construction workers until 1952. The first appellate
case to construe the 'Workmen's Safety" sections was Hard v. Hollywood
Turf Club,22 decided in that year. The plaintiff employee of a painting
subcontractor was injured when the scaffold on which he was working col-
lapsed. The scaffold had been erected by the plaintiff's immediate em-
ployer, the subcontractor, in violation of Labor Code sections 7151 and
7152, relating to safety in scaffolding. The injured workman sued the gen-
eral contractor, alleging that he was an employer with the definition of
section 6304 and therefore subject to the duties imposed by sections 6401,
7151, and 7152. The trial judge so instructed and the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff.
In a lengthy opinion, the district court of appeal reversed on the limited
basis that the general contractor was not subject to the duties imposed by
the safety-in-scaffolding provisions. The court reasoned that the section
6304 definition of employer is confined by section 630123 to Part 1 of Divi-
sion 5, while the scaffolding provisions are found in Part 3 of the division. 24
Although it did not so hold, the court must have assumed that the general
contractor was an employer within section 6304, for otherwise there would
have been no reason to dispose of the case on the particular basis which the
'
0 These safety orders are not directed specifically to the general contractor or to
the subcontractor responsible for performance of the details of the work, but merely
state how certain work should be done when it is undertaken. See 8 CAL. ADmnm. CODE
§§ 3200-4207 (1955), for explanatory material and examples of safety orders.
20 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6318.
2 Campbell v. Fong Wan, 60 Cal. App. 2d 553, 141 P.2d (1943).
22 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 246 P.2d 716 (1952). The case came up again on appeal
under the same name, 134 Cal. App. 2d 174, 285 P.2d 321 (1955).
23 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6301, in Part 1 of Division 5, states: "As used in this part,
the terms described in the following sections shall have the meaning therein given them."
(Emphasis added.)
24 112 Cal. App. 2d at 268, 246 P.2d at 721.
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court utilized.25 If the general contractor were not a section 6304 employer,
there could have been no basis for imposing on him the duties prescribed
by sections 7151 and 7152. The opinion is puzzling, however, because
although the court apparently assumed that the general contractor was an
employer within the definition of section 6304, it did not dispose of the
plaintiff's contention that he was subject to the duties prescribed by section
6401, which does appear in Part 1 of Division 5.26 The failure of the court
in Hard to clearly express the rationale of its decision was especially unfor-
tunate since the case was one of first impression.
The ambiguous opinion in Hard seems to have brought the possibility
of recoveries from the general contractor under the Labor Code to the
attention of injured workmen. After lying dormant for thirty-five years,
the "Workmen's Safety" provisions of the Labor Code have been invoked
in a number of cases since Hard, with varying degrees of success, in at-
tempts to recover from the general contractor for employment injuries.
The first case to hold that the general contractor was a section 6304
employer was Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc.2 7 In that case
an employee of a subcontractor sued the general contractor to recover for
an injury sustained when he fell down the stairs of a building under con-
struction by the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that the general contractor
was subject to stricter duties than those of an invitor: that he was subject
to the broad duty to provide a safe place to work under section 6400 and
subject to the minimum standards of a safety order which had been violated.
The trial court gave instructions to this effect and the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff.
The district court of appeal affirmed, holding that the general contractor
was a section 6304 employer because there was "substantial evidence" that
he had maintained "direction, management, control"28 of the stairs where
the plaintiff was injured. The court stated that these provisions were meant
to impose greater duties on the general contractor than those to which
he is subject as an invitor.29 Hard was distinguished on the basis that in
that case there had been no evidence of any control by the general con-
tractor over the employees of the subcontractor, nor did the general con-
25 By way of dictum the court stated that it would impose an "extremely onerous
burden" upon the general contractor to hold him liable for the negligence of subcon-
tractors in failing to comply with safety provisions. 112 Cal. App 2d at 271, 246 P.2d
at 722.
26 On consolidation and subsequent appeal the plaintiff employee of the subcon-
tractor urged that the earlier decision had done no more than hold that sections 7151
and 7152 were not applicable, and he suggested that section 6401 did impose a statutory
duty on the general contractor. The court agreed that the first case had made only the
limited holding but declined to consider whether section 6401 would apply. 134 Cal.
App 2d 174, 285 P.2d 321, supra note 22.
27 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956).
28 Id. at 582, 298 P.2d at 705. A subcontractor had left the stairs in the dangerous
condition in violation of the safety order but had finished his work, so informed the
general contractor, and returned custody to the general contractor whose duty it was
to finish the work and make the stairs safe. See also Jean v. Collins Constr. Co., 215 Cal.
App. 2d 410, 30 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1963).
29 142 Cal. App. 2d at 581, 298 P.2d at 704.
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tractor have anything to do with the construction of the scaffold. This is
quite true, but absence of control was not the basis of the Hard decision30
Though the general contractor might have been held liable as an invitor,
Atherley must be taken to stand for the proposition that a general contractor
will be subjected to Labor Code duties to employees of a subcontractor
when he exercises or assumes control, presumably more than mere super-
visory control, over the particular area on the site in which the employee
is injured.
The next significant development occurred in Gonzales v. Robert J. Hiller
Constr. Co.,31 where the district court of appeal once again held a general
contractor subject to Labor Code duties to an employee of a subcontractor.
The action was brought by the widow of an employee of a subcontractor
engaged in installing reinforcing steel in a building under construction by
the defendant general contractor. The decedent was working on the second
floor of the building, which at that time was a framework of steel beams.
He was struck by a metal pan which had fallen down the outside of the
building from the seventh floor and had been deflected into the building
where it struck the deceased. The pan had been used by a flooring sub-
contractor as a form for concrete which had been poured on the seventh
floor. It was the procedure of the flooring subcontractor to knock these pans
loose when the concrete was almost dry and let them fall to a scaffold
immediately below. The scaffold was poorly constructed so that the fatal
pan fell through it and out of the building.
It appeared that the general contractor's supervisor knew of the floor-
ing subcontractors dangerous method of removing the pans and had failed
to provide any kind of a protective device around the outside of the build-
ing, though another workman had been injured by a falling object some
weeks earlier. However, it did not appear that the general contractor had
exercised any more than general supervisory control over the flooring sub-
contractor. He did not direct the subcontractor in performing the operative
details of the work,3 2 which is the traditional basis on which the courts have
held an employer accountable for the negligence of an independent con-
tractor. 33
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff,34 holding
that the general contractor had breached the duties imposed on him by
section 6400 in failing to provide the decedent with a safe place in which
to work. The court quoted verbatim sections 6304, 6400, and 6401 and
stated that "These statutes apply to the general contractor."35 Thus without
30 See note 24 supra.
31 179 Cal. App. 2d 522, 3 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1960).
32The general contractor's supervisor had "watched the operations" of the subcon-
tractor on the day of the accident. Id. at 531, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
a3 PRossEn, TORTS § 64 (2d ed. 1955).
34 The trial below was before a court sitting without a jury so that there was no
question concerning instructions, as there was in Hard, supra note 22, and in Atherley,
supra note 27.
35 179 Cal. App. 2d at 530, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court cited three cases for this
proposition. The first was Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App.
2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956), supra note 27, in which control by the general contractor
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even considering whether the general contractor had exercised more than
general supervisory control over the work, the court found that he was
subject to Labor Code duties .3 The case appears to go beyond Atherley to
hold that a general contractor is subject in all cases to Labor Code duties
to employees of subcontractors. However, any value which Gonzales may
have as precedent for such a proposition was nullified by the supreme court
in Kuntz v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co.3 7
Kuntz was a case similar in many significant respects to Gonzales. The
plaintiff was an ironworker employed by a subcontractor in the construc-
tion of a building under the supervision of the general contractor. He sued
the general contractor for injuries sustained when steel decking panels,
negligently laid by a flooring subcontractor, gave way beneath him, pre-
cipitating him to the floor below. The general contractor had not assumed
direct supervision over the operations of the flooring subcontractor but,
as in Gonzales, he was aware of the method used in installing the panels.
In fact, the general contractor's supervisor had been informed by a state
safety engineer that the decking was being laid in an improper manner,
but he had failed to communicate this information to the flooring subcon-
tractor. As "generalissimo"8 of the project, he could of course have com-
pelled the subcontractor to discontinue the unsafe practice.
Admitting that the Labor Code was applicable in certain situations to
a general contractor, and that its effect was to impose greater duties than
common law invitor duties, the supreme court nevertheless reversed the
judgment for the plaintiff because the trial court had instructed that the
general contractor was subject to Labor Code provisions. The court found
was the ostensible basis of the decision. The other two cases dealt with the application
of Labor Code provisions to owners and not general contractors. In Johnson v. A. Schilling
& Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 318, 339 P.2d 139 (1959), re'd on other grounds, 194 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1961), the provisions were applied to an owner who
had turned the premises over to the contractor when they were in an unsafe condition.
The employee of the contractor was injured because of this danger. In Maia v. Security
Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 16, 324 P.2d 657 (1958), the employee of
a subcontractor was injured by the active negligence of an employee of the owner who
had maintained custody of the premises.
36 Despite the language of Atherley, supra note 35, which is one of the leading
cases in this field, the Labor Code cases have not always turned on the basis of the
general contractor's control. The Schilling case, supra note 35, held an owner subject
to Labor Code provisions who had relinquished control but had left a latent danger
on the premises. In Delgado v. W. C. Garcia & Associates, 212 Cal. App. 2d 5, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (1963), the court held the general contractor to the duties of the Labor Code
because he had contracted at the beginning of the project that he would comply with
all applicable safety provisions. n Seckler v. Yamin, 212 Cal. App. 2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1963), the court held the general contractor liable under the provisions because
he had given the subcontractor a general plan which was unsafe, rather than on any
showing that he maintained control over the operative details of the work.
37 57 Cal..2d 100, 18 Cal. Rptr. 527, 368 P.2d 127 (1961).
38 Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club, 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 269, 246 P.2d 716, 720
(1952), supra note 22. The use of this word is indicative that the courts recognize that
the general contractor has a great deal of control over subcontractors if he wishes to
exercise it.
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that there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a judgment based
on the defendant's breach of his duty as invitor to use reasonable care in
maintaining the premises in a safe condition, but held that it was error to
instruct that the defendant was subject to the Labor Code duties.
The court expressed agreement with the dictum in Hard that to enforce
Labor Code duties against the general contractor would be to place an
"extremely onerous burden"31 upon him, and reasoned that the Labor Code
was intended to apply to a general contractor who exercised more than
"general supervision and control"40 over the work. For this proposition,
the court relied on Hard, noting that there the court had held that the
"safety provisions of the code relating to the work done by the subcontractor
were not applicable in determining the [general contractor's] liability."41
This is not an accurate statement of the holding in Hard for it will be re-
membered that there the court decided merely that the general contractor
was not subject to the specific scaffolding provisions of sections 7151 and
7152, 42 without deciding the question whether he was subject to the more
general duties of sections 6400 and 6401.
The supreme court agreed with Atherley that control was the determin-
ing factor and distinguished Gonzales on the basis that there the general
contractor had agreed with the negligent subcontractor on the dangerous
method employed. Since an agreement would be merely evidence that
the general contractor had exercised control over the manner in which the
subcontractor had performed the work, and since Gonzales did not consider
the question of control, Kuntz is in effect a rejection of Gonzales.41 This pro-
nouncement by the supreme court in Kuntz established that, despite the
broad definition of employer in section 6304, a general contractor is subject
to Labor Code duties only when he exercises control over the manner in
which the work is performed.
The Problem of Control
The effect of the Kuntz decision, that a general contractor is subject
to Labor Code duties only when he exercises more than general supervisory
control, is to make the Labor Code of limited usefulness to employees of
subcontractors. Whether the general contractor in the particular case exer-
cises more than general supervisory control will often be a difficult question
of fact, which should be decided by the jury. Since the supreme court did
not say what constitutes sufficient control, presumably the test is much like
that used in determining whether an employee is an independent contractor
so as to insulate the employer from liability under the doctrine of respondeat
29 57 Cal. 2d at 107, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 531, 368 P.2d at 131. See note 25 supra.
40 Id. at 106, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 531, 368 P.2d at 131.
41 Id. at 107, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 531, 368 P.2d at 131.
42 See note 24 supra.
43Kuntz v. Mitchell Steel, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961), is the district
court of appeal treatment of the case eventually reaching the supreme court. This opinion
contains a good discussion of the Labor Code cases up to that time, including Hard,
Atherley, and Gonzales. The court criticized Gonzales, pointing out that by failing to
discuss the element of control the Gonzales court had ignored the distinction which
Atherley made so important in holding the general contractor to Labor Code duties.
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superior.4 4 This means that the jury should be instructed that the general
contractor is an employer within the definition of section 6304 and subject
to the duties imposed by Part 1 of Division 5 if he exercises control over
the operative details of the work.45 Without an instruction to the jury to
determine this question of fact, the plaintiff-employee of the subcontractor
faces the possibility of reversal of a judgment on a verdict in his favor in
a higher court any time he brings his action against the general contractor
on the basis of these Labor Code duties.46
Apparently the court in Kuntz was concerned that if it held the general
contractor to be subject to the duties imposed by Part 1 of Division 5 in
all cases, it would subject him to vicarious liability for the negligence of
any subcontractor on the job. But a careful reading of the provisions shows
that they do not place an absolute duty upon the section 6304 employer
to provide a safe place for all employees on the construction site. The duty
to furnish a safe place to work does not expose the employer to liability
for every accidental injury occurring on the premises, for the duty merely
contemplates the use of reasonable care. 47 Thus the general contractor,
even if subject in all cases to Labor Code duties, would be liable only for
his own negligence in failing to inspect and correct defective conditions
and practices of which he has or reasonably should have knowledge. In
addition to being under the common law duty of an invitor, the general
contractor would be under a statutory duty to exercise reasonable care to
maintain a safe place to work and comply with applicable safety orders.
The effect of imposing these statutory duties upon the general contrac-
tor would be to give the plaintiff employee a procedural advantage. Provi-
sions of the Labor Code and the safety orders enacted thereunder receive
judicial notice by the courts.48 In accordance with the general rule in Cali-
fornia, a violation of these provisions gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
of negligence.-, This presumption is evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict
even in the face of conflicting evidence50 The effect of the presumption
is to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant
44 REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 414 (1934), deals with the element of control in determin-
ing whether there is an independent contractor relationship.
4 See Cal. Jury Instructions, Civil No. 54-F (1958), for the approved instruction
under which the jury determines the existence of an independent contractor or agency
relationship.
46See, e.g., Kuntz v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 100, 18 Cal. Rptr. 527,
368 P.2d 127 (1961); Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club, 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 246 P.2d
716 (1952).
47The definition of "safe" and "safety" in CA.. LABOR CODE § 6310 are also couched
in terms of reasonable care.
4 8 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1875 provides that statutes receive judicial notice. Con-
struction safety orders were held to receive judicial notice in Martin v. Food Machinery
Corp., 100 Cal. App. 2d 244, 223 P.2d 293 (1950).
49 Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
Statements that violation of a safety statute is negligence as a matter of law appear in
many Labor Code cases. See, e.g., Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson Inc., 142
Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956).
50 18 CAL. Juir. 2d Evidence § 67 (1954).
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general contractor.51 Evidence that, despite violation of the statutory duty,
his conduct was that of a reasonable man is sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion and sustain a verdict in his favor. 2
The Labor Code provisions would also be of advantage to the injured
workman because it is easier to establish negligence from breach of a spe-
cific statutory duty than it is to prove it by means of a more broad "duty
of care," in the face of what may often be conflicting expert testimony.
These rules of evidence would not be unduly harsh on the general contrac-
tor, for even where the plaintiff employee is able to establish negligence
under the broad Labor Code provisions or a specific safety order, the general
contractor will have available the defense of contributory negligence, though
assumption of risk is not available to him where violation of a safety statute
is involved."
Conclusion
By imposing Labor Code duties on a general contractor only when he
exercises more than general supervisory control over the work of subcon-
tractors, the supreme court has failed to abide by clear legislative intent.
Furthermore, the court has overlooked the realities of the construction
industry by reasoning that it would be an "onerous burden" to subject the
general contractor to the duty of complying with the statutory provisions
and safety orders. As the court stressed in Gonzales v. Robert I. Hiller
Constr. Co., 4 the general contractor as overseer of the project is in a posi-
tion to insure compliance with safety provisions by his subcontractors. His
standing as supervisor and co-ordinator should enable him to discover
methods which, while safe for the employees of one subcontractor, may be
unsafe for the employees of others on the construction site. Placing the
general contractor under an affirmative duty to provide all workmen on
the site with a safe place to work should have a recognizable effect in deter-
ing construction accidents. Whatever burden this would impose on the
general contractor would surely be outweighed by the benefits to the indus-
try from prevention of accidents.
James B. Cuneo*
51 Ibid.
52 Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal. 2d 474, 218 P.2d 531 (1950).
53 Mula v. Meyer, 132 Cal. App. 2d 279, 282 P.2d 107 (1955).
54 179 Cal. App. 2d 522, 3 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1960), supra note 31.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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